

HELPS FOR STUDENTS OF HISTORY. No. 11.

EDITED BY C. JOHNSON, M.A., AND J. P. WHITNEY, B.D., D.C.L.

THE PERIOD OF CONGRESSES

BY

SIR A. W. WARD, LITT.D., F.B.A.

MASTER OF PETERHOUSE, CAMBRIDGE

III

AIX-LA-CHAPELLE TO VERONA

LONDON:
SOCIETY FOR PROMOTING
CHRISTIAN KNOWLEDGE
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CONGRESSES—III

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AIX-LA-CHAPELLE TO VERONA

C.—THE CONGRESS OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE¹

1818

FRANCE AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE

To understand the condition of affairs, more especially in France, which led to the assembling of the second of the Congresses under review, it is necessary to glance at the course of events in the three years after the Second Peace of Paris, which bore directly upon the resort of the Powers to the

¹ The special literature of this and the succeeding three Congresses is less considerable in bulk than might be expected. A survey of the principal published and unpublished documents, as well as of contemporary and of later memoirs and other works, will be found in the bibliography to W. Alison Phillips's chapter in vol. x. of the *Cambridge Modern History* already cited. See also the latter part of his *Confederations of Europe* (1914). The best summary of European history from the end of 1815 to the Congress of Verona, and of that and the three preceding Congresses in particular, is continued in vols. i. and ii. of the eminent Swiss historian A. Stern's *Geschichte Europas seit den Verträgen von 1815* (Berlin, 1894-97), to which work a special acknowledgment is due from the present writer, together with thanks to its author for many courtesies, the more welcome for the troublous times during which they were bestowed.

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Congressional expedient. In France, the ambition of the Ultras, who at first had it all their own way in Government and Chamber, was, avowedly, to set up a system of administration wholly irreconcilable with the spirit of centralised democracy, which had draped itself in the forms of the Napoleonic empire. The suicidal folly of these fanatics was transparent to all the members of the Quadruple Alliance, of whose policy the preservation, not the ruin, of the French monarchy, formed an integral part. But there was much difference of opinion among the Four Powers as to the remedies to be pressed upon the French Government; and even the Russian ambassador, Pozzo di Borgo, so late as April, 1816, shrank from a collective representation in favour of the dissolution of the ‘undiscoverable,’ or unmanageable, Chamber, urged by his Prussian colleague, Count von der Goltz. The result was that, in the summer of this year, a political persecution set in, out of all proportion to the provocations which had caused it; and the Tsar thought it incumbent upon him to intervene with his advice, in the name of an Alliance by no means unanimous in approving his action. In the end (September 5th), the Chamber was dissolved, and a more moderate assembly took its place (November). Richelieu had hoped that this change, as favourable to the prospect of internal peace in France, and commanding itself to the approval of the Allies, would lead to the recall of at least part of the army of occupation; but, on this occasion, Wellington’s caution prevailed over his wish to promote the interests of the Bourbon régime, and no concession was made except that of

a brief postponement in the payment of the indemnity. Though further internal troubles followed in France, they were not such as to call for any special measure on the part of the Allies; but a question directly connected with them was the payment of arrears due from France to foreign creditors—debts very miscellaneous in character, but amounting, by 1817–8, to the formidable total of 1570 millions of francs. Thanks to the rather ostentatious generosity of Alexander, and the less demonstrative moderation of Wellington, a composition was arranged, which was accepted by the French Chamber and the creditors in April, 1818. As to the general political situation in France, the representatives of the Four Powers had in 1816–17 been repeatedly plied for their support of ultra-royalist action; but, in the spring of 1818, these operations were subjected to an unwelcome exposure. By order of Decazes, Fouché's successor in the Ministry of Police, and a particular favourite of Louis XVIII. (who created him Count and pair), the last of the confidential memoranda for the use of Foreign Powers, drawn up by the Comte d'Artois' active follower, Baron de Vitrolles, was put into print, as evidence of a plot of which he was the agent. De Vitrolles' name was struck off the list of the Privy Council, and this attempt to stimulate foreign influence upon the conduct of the nation's affairs had thus received a very plain rebuff. Clearly, though it might still be necessary to continue the occupation of French soil, the national susceptibility was wide awake and unlikely to bear much longer with the subjection of France to the tutelage of the Quadruple Alliance.

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CALL FOR ANOTHER CONGRESS—POLICY OF AUSTRIA

A change in the relations between that Alliance and France was, therefore, becoming urgently necessary, and seemed to be of so much importance as to warrant the assembling of another Congress, if anything like a real Concert of Europe was to come to pass. In other respects, the conclusions reached by the Congress of Vienna seemed as yet to call for completion rather than change. The Austrian monarchy had come forth from the Congress with enlarged limits and heightened prestige, rather than with any increase of internal strength. With the exception of the Magyars in Hungary, the nationalities in the Empire were but beginning to assert themselves, while, in the same connexion, the Government was seeking quietly to weaken the foundations of prescriptive rights. On the other hand, the Austrian Government was traditionally averse from adopting harsh methods in ordinary administration; and, in the new Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, it tempered its rule by the establishment of a sort of provincial representative system. Indeed, Metternich was by no means blind to the advantages of the introduction of something in the nature of popular representation throughout the Austrian empire; but he lacked the moral courage needed for inducing the Emperor Francis to give his assent to such a step. Thus, the existence of the Austrian empire, as a whole and in its several parts, continued to depend largely on administrative traditions of which, in full accordance with the temperament of the Emperor, those of the Police were by far

the most important; and its foreign policy remained one of unceasing watchfulness against the symptoms of outbreaks which might upset, or of ulterior designs which might undermine, the edifice laboriously built up by circumspect statecraft.

In non-Austrian Germany, the failure of Prussia, in spite of the leading part she had played in the Wars of Liberation, to exact from France a peace corresponding to the demands of the national ambition, could not but contribute to the decrease, almost approaching extinction, of the feeling in favour of a Prussian hegemony which had been so assiduously fostered in the lesser states. The ascendancy of Austria could not have been more strongly marked than it was in the initial period of the Federal Diet; and, while her final settlement with Bavaria was still delayed and her relations with the other south-German states were strained by the Württemberg scheme of a League of secondary southern states, there was as yet no question of actual Prussian rivalry. Indeed, the Prussian Government showed signs of falling in with the reaction, favoured by the Austrian, against the display of a restless patriotic enthusiasm, inspired by the hopes as well as the achievements of the late wars, and demanding a consummation which those achievements had failed to secure. The period was already drawing to a close of patriotic demonstrations, more especially in the imaginative spheres of the academic world—during which nationalism, destined to become, in the next generation, the most marked feature in the life of the European peoples, had continued to assert itself far more conspicuously in Germany than in

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any other country of the continent. It was superseded by an age of official and, officious denunciation and repression; and, with an exception that only proved the rule (Karl August of Weimar), the German Governments were unanimously intent upon this inglorious domestic campaign.

Outside Germany, too, Austria had, at first, no difficulty in maintaining the ascendancy assured to her policy through the Vienna compacts, notwithstanding the endeavours of Alexander to infuse into the Quadruple the less finite spirit of the Holy Alliance. The conservatism of Metternich's foreign policy was prone to reckon with all Powers, except that of the Future. In Italy, all that he asked was that the Governments should follow the Austrian lead, ruling without harshness populations which, in their turn, were expected to ignore the memories of the past and the ideals of the future. A secret article of a Treaty concluded (June 5th, 1815) between Austria and the restored Bourbon King Ferdinand IV. of Naples¹ bound him to introduce no changes into the government of his Neapolitan kingdom incompatible with its ancient monarchical institutions, or with the principles adopted by the Emperor of Austria for the rule of his own Italian provinces. With Tuscany, Metternich was, to begin with, rather less successful; but, by the summer of 1817, the provisions of the Vienna Act concerning the north-Italian duchies had been supplemented—at the cost of Napoleon's son, no longer the

¹ He was Ferdinand III. of Sicily, and from December, 1816, Ferdinand I. of the Two Sicilies.

'wondrous child' of former days—by an arrangement satisfactory to all other interests concerned (including that of Spain) as well as to Austria's own. The uncomfortable ambition of Sardinia Metternich was unable to disarm; but, clear-sighted though he was, he had not, in general, any inclination to trouble himself about the remoter future.

In her Italian policy, Austria had the support of Great Britain—the story of a general Treaty between the two Powers as to Italian affairs in July, 1813, may, however, be dismissed as fiction—as well as of the other members of the Quadruple Alliance. But, both in her Eastern policy and, in a measure, in that of Great Britain, suspicion of Russia was an element warranted by unforgettable historical experience, and intensified by their knowledge of the influence continuously allowed by the Tsar to one of the ablest of his intimates, the Corfiote Count J. C. Capo d'Istria, the pride of his countrymen and the hope of their patriotic propaganda.

The proposal made by Metternich, in 1817, to carry into effect the design of the Four Great Powers to meet periodically for the discussion of the state of Europe with a view to the maintenance of its peace, had fallen through; nor was it till the autumn of the following year, 1818, that it was taken up again. Aix-la-Chapelle, whose central position commended it to all the Powers, was chosen as the place of the Congress now contemplated. It was generally understood that the speedy evacuation of France would be the first subject for consideration at the meeting: it was not so certain what attitude the Quadruple Al-

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liance would adopt towards France after her release from armed supervision. Pozzo di Borgo warned the Tsar against any action on the part of the Allies which, by seeking to keep France under their continued control, would tend to isolate Russia, jealousy of whom was predominant among them. He would have preferred that the Concert of Europe were based on the principles of the Holy Alliance rather than on those of the Treaty of Chaumont. But nothing was further from Metternich's intentions than to follow any course calculated to give a prerogative voice in the Concert to Russia, who had of late been very prolific of political counsels. In the course of the summer of 1818, however, Metternich had occasion to convince himself of the wholesome dread of the revolutionary spirit which, in spite of Alexander's Liberal and Constitutional philanderings, was more and more taking hold of him; while the general success of Metternich's German policy, together with the likelihood that the views of Great Britain on European affairs would remain in substantial agreement with those of Austria, bade fair to assure to them the general support of Prussia, also, at the impending Congress.

THE CONGRESS OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE

Thus, towards the close of September, 1818, the ancient city of Charlemagne began to fill with an assembly whose numbers and distinction approached, though of course they could not rival, those of the Vienna Congress itself. At Aix-la-Chapelle, the Emperors Francis and Alexander

and King Frederick William III. were once more present in person, with Metternich, Capo d'Istria and Nesselrode (afterwards reinforced by Pozzo di Borgo), and Hardenberg as their chief plenipotentiaries. Castlereagh and Wellington represented Great Britain; while the Prime-minister of France, the Duc de Richelieu, awaited the results of the preliminary meetings of the Four Powers. The protocols of the Congress were once more in the hands of Gentz, who had good reason for declaring this Congress the culminating point of his career. Prominent among the outsiders in attendance were heads of some of the great banking-houses of Europe—Rothschild, Baring and others; for the primary business of the meeting—the terms of the evacuation of France—had a very important financial aspect.

EVACUATION OF FRANCE—FRANCE ADMITTED TO THE CONCERT OF EUROPE

The evacuation of France within the next two months was, in accordance with the general expectation, agreed upon by the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle at its first two meetings (September 30th and October 1st, 1818), and settled by a Treaty signed (October 9th) by the plenipotentiaries of the Four Powers and Richelieu, who had been immediately admitted to their meetings. It was also arranged that the remainder of the war indemnity should be paid, in two instalments, by the end of September, 1819. Hardly had the Tsar and the King of Prussia returned to Aix-la-Chapelle from a visit to the King of France in his capital, when

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the thorny question of the future position of France in the Concert of Europe was brought to a settlement. The solution of the problem, difficult in itself, was not made easier by the French elections, which had, in fact, proved unfavourable to the existing *régime*, or by a financial crisis at Paris. The influence of Russia, always eager to display her goodwill to French interests, had supported Richelieu's contention that France should be admitted to the Concert on a footing of equality with the other Great Powers; and Alexander had at heart nothing less than the organisation of a European authority which should as it were clothe in flesh and blood his ideal Holy Alliance. This project was opposed by Castlereagh, in a memorandum pronouncing it derogatory to the dignity of the Holy Alliance to contaminate its purposes with ordinary diplomatic obligations, such as could alone be looked for in treaties; so that, after this half-ironical fashion, the British Government first indicated the policy which was hereafter to bring the Concert of Europe to an end. Austria favoured the cautious policy of renewing the Quadruple Alliance and admitting France to a share in its deliberations in particular instances only. The British plenipotentiaries, though alike well disposed towards the existing French Government, were, however, hampered by their own unwillingness to ask Parliament to approve such a continuance of the existing system of European policy. Already, in the Cabinet itself, Canning was raising his voice against the principle of a devolution of the conduct of European affairs upon Congresses of the Great Powers. Accordingly,

Hardenberg characteristically proposed, as a compromise, that France should, openly, be invited to join the existing Alliance, but that, secretly, the Four Powers should counterbalance this concession by renewing the old Treaty between them. The process by which this disingenuous proposal was carried betrayed the mistrust accompanying the concession whereby the Concert of Europe was to be called into life. After, on November 4th, Metternich had, once more, opposed the conclusion of a formal Treaty of Alliance between the Five Powers, the plenipotentiaries of the Four apprised Richelieu that, since the condition of France warranted an immediate termination of the occupation, her King was invited to join the other Sovereigns in taking counsel for the preservation of the Peace of Europe and, in token thereof, to participate in their present and future deliberations. Hereupon, a Protocol was signed, on November 15th, by the plenipotentiaries of the Five Powers, which was communicated to every other Government which had signed the Act of the Vienna Congress or any of the Paris Treaties. The Concert of Europe was, though not under that name, formally established by this declaration of the aims of the new Union, not with reference to any special occasion, or the advancement of any particular interest, but as directed to a maintenance of the General Peace, based on a strict observance of Treaties, while it was stipulated that notice should be given of any Conferences deemed requisite between Sovereigns or Ministers. To these Conferences other (lesser) states were to be admitted, if their particular affairs or interests were to form

the subject of discussion. Gentz's pen was employed on a Declaration offering to Europe this pledge of her future tranquillity.¹

THE EUROPEAN 'PENTARCHY'

Thus, the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle had carried to an issue the first practical attempt at the establishment of a plan for the international conduct of European polities. This new Holy Alliance—whether it merited that epithet or not, and whether or not the designs of certain of the Powers included in it contained elements deservedly suspect (as they, certainly, were to Castlereagh from this date onwards)—was in its main design neither insidious nor ignoble. It is true that, in some respects, the obligations of the European 'Pentarchy' were left as indefinite as had been those of the Holy Alliance itself. The attempt made by Austria, at the Congress of Vienna, to commit the Signatory Powers to a guarantee of the territorial integrity of all existing states (not omitting the Ottoman empire) was, at Aix-la-Chapelle, revived by the same Power, this time with the approval of the Tsar, provided it were limited to Europe. But it met with no support from the British Government, which knew very well with what sort of a reception such a scheme would meet from Parliament. It was accordingly dropped, and carried with it into oblivion certain further provisions which, in a memorandum issued in 1816, the Prussian Ancillon had sought to graft

¹ For the Declaration see d'Angeberg, pp. 1760 f., and for the Protocol to which it is annexed, *ib.*, pp. 1755 f.

on such a guarantee, in favour of a League of European Nations, with Congresses expanded into tribunals of arbitration for the settlement of all international difficulties.

On the same 15th of November, 1818, on which the European Pentarchy began its brief course of existence, the old Quadruple Alliance of Chaumont was renewed, so as to be ready to meet what continued to seem possible—the occurrence of some internal crisis in France. And it was only the cool prudence of Wellington which prevented the preparation of plans of military operations for eventual use; while the Prussian plan of leaving garrisons in the Netherlands fortresses was resisted by the King of the Netherlands himself.

GERMAN AFFAIRS

While the relations between France and the other Great Powers were thus placed upon a more satisfactory footing, the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, proceeded to deal with other matters left unsettled at Vienna. Some of these concerned the states forming part of the Germanic Confederation. Their territorial limits and the Constitution of the entire body were under the guarantee of the Act of the Congress; but it was inevitable that many aspects of the political and social life of Germany should form the subject of intimate communications between the two German Great Powers. From Aix-la-Chapelle, Metternich indited two Memorials for confidential communication to the King of Prussia, designed to impress more strongly upon his easily impressed mind the substance of the counsels the Austrian statesman had recently

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found opportunities of tendering to him in conversation. These documents dealt with the 'innovating' attempts to undermine loyal and dutiful feelings in the younger generation at the German Universities, especially by means of the Students' Unions (*Burschenschaften*), and here and elsewhere through the Gymnastic Associations (*Turnvereine*), one of the most widespread popular institutions of the day. The danger was demonstrated of carrying out in Prussia, as explicitly promised by the King, the article (XII.) of the Federal Act holding out the prospect of a Constitution, with a parliament representing the entire kingdom. Metternich's advice came home to Frederick William III., and contributed not a little to encourage him in a reactionary policy, and in the desire to conform the spirit of his Government to that of the Austrian which marked the later years of his reign. The bearing of Alexander at Aix-la-Chapelle showed that he, too, was at one with Metternich as to the necessity of opposing the revolutionary tendencies of the age, particularly in Germany, and of repressing their manifestations there at the Universities and in the Press.

As to certain questions affecting individual German states and dynasties, there was no difficulty in putting a stop upon the ambition of the Elector William I. of Hesse to be invested with the dignity of King. More circumspection was needed in settling the affairs of Baden, complicated as they were by the ambition of Bavaria and her uneasy relations with Austria. The retrocession by Bavaria of the duchy of Salzburg and certain parts of Upper Austria, promised in 1814, had been

delayed, in consequence of the apparently insuperable difficulty of furnishing Bavaria with acceptable equivalents; and the Congress of Vienna had been unable to come to a conclusion on the subject. At last, in April, 1816, it was arranged that Bavaria was to receive certain lesser territorial compensations on the Rhine, and should, in addition, on the imminent extinction of the direct male line of the grand-ducal House of Baden, become possessed of the coveted Rhenish Palatinate. In April, 1817, Grand-duke Charles had, by the promulgation of a family statute, sought to secure his inheritance, which was at the same time declared indivisible, to the descendants of the second (morganatic) marriage of his predecessor—the Hochberg line. The Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle now accorded the desired recognition to the new Baden succession; and Bavaria had, though unwillingly, to submit to the loss of the much-desired Rhenish Palatinate; although the Wittelsbach dynasty did not cease to cherish the hope of ultimately obtaining possession of it.

SPAIN AND HER COLONIES

Of greater importance, as exhibiting a distinct difference of point of view among the Great Powers themselves which was before long to create a lasting breach in the newly established system of the Concert of Europe, was the question of the relations between Spain, to the course of whose internal affairs reference will be made immediately, and her insurgent South-American Colonies. The germs of their struggle for independence may be

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traced back even before the beginning of the century, but its actual course had been run, not altogether continuously, since 1808 and the crisis of the abdication of Ferdinand VII. In 1816, the independence of the Argentine Provinces had been proclaimed, and, two years later, Bolivar had issued a corresponding declaration from his Capital, Angostura. But as yet, while absolute government under the restored Ferdinand VII. prevailed in Spain, forcible repression was the only way in which the monarchy could bring itself to meet the rebellion. The insurgent leaders and the Governments set up by them had, however, from the first looked for British as well as North-American support. Although, in 1814, Great Britain had concluded a Treaty with Spain, by which she promised a cessation of any supply of arms or other materials of war to the insurgents, her sailors led and manned their ships, her financiers negotiated loans for them, and her merchant navy openly traded with their ports. By 1817, these relations had become fully established; and it was only by piracy and filibustering that Spain could resist commercial operations against which she strongly protested—while the United States, which had for some time looked with unconcealed expectancy upon the action of the South-American Colonies, were actually sending commissioners, to be at once followed by consuls, to their ports in revolt. Russia and France were desirous of admitting the Bourbon King of Spain to the deliberations of the Congress at Aix-la-Chapelle; though such a step, besides not being easy to take, would have been out of harmony with the restrictive principle of

the Concert. It was, accordingly, declined. When, hereupon, France and Russia proposed to try the effect of the advice of the Congress between the combatants, Castlereagh was found unwilling to join in any attempt to bring back the insurgent Colonies authoritatively under Spanish rule, unless a declaration were previously issued by Great Britain that she was not prepared in any case to interrupt her commercial relations with them; while Wellington declined to undertake a confidential mission on behalf of the Powers to Madrid, where it was still hoped to overcome South-American resistance by force. The still continuing quarrel between Spain and Portugal, in which France and Russia were, again, anxious to further the interests of the Bourbon Monarchy, and which, under British pressure, the Paris Conference of Ambassadors had previously essayed to settle, the Congress was, likewise, unable to bring to a satisfactory conclusion.

OTHER EFFORTS OF THE CONGRESS

More success attended the efforts to end the differences between the Scandinavian Powers, by inducing Sweden to fulfil the obligations undertaken by her towards Denmark in the Peace of Kiel (January, 1814). The Congress, also, laid a direct injunction for the better government of his principality upon the autocrat of Monaco. But, in matters of wider bearing or of more general interest, it could only display an activity accompanied by what very closely resembled impotence. The outrages which con-

tinued to be perpetrated by the Barbary pirates on or beyond the Mediterranean shores were met by a proposal from Metternich, quite out of harmony with the usually cool and limited character of his methods, for the restoration of the Maltese Order, of which the Tsar Alexander would, probably, not have been unwilling to accept the grand-mastership. But the pirates were left in command of the situation. Nor was the still larger question of the suppression of the Slave-trade, which Great Britain continued to urge, together with the adoption of a general Convention establishing the Right of Search, carried to any definite solution. France thought it became her dignity to refuse such a Convention, while Russia launched a counter-project for an international authority, with an international fleet, on the west coast of Africa. Nothing was done, except that some admonitions were administered to Portugal, who had declined to follow the example of Spain by concluding a bargain as to the abolition of the obnoxious trade.

The labours of the Congress were, however, not exhausted by the accomplishment of these, on the whole, insignificant results. A unanimous assent was accorded to the Russian memorandum, drawn up by Pozzo di Borgo in reply to Bonapartist complaints (including one² from the mother of Napoleon), as to the treatment of the prisoner at St. Helena. This document expressed the present views of the Tsar, though even Castlereagh thought some of the expressions employed by 'Corsican against Corsican' too pointed. Alexander seemed to have finally settled down into a detestation of

the Revolution in all its phases, quite after Metternich's heart; and thus, at the end of November, 1818, the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle closed, having, to all outward semblance, testified to a complete agreement among the Great Powers as to the political principles which they had assembled to assert in common. The Congress, however, left much to confirm and much to complete; and, though its leading statesmen, on the whole, regarded the consummation reached by it with complacency, and the prospect of preserving the Peace of Europe, which it had laboured to maintain, with confidence, yet more than one rift was visible in the partly very artificial edifice now confronting the world. Nor was it long before a change came over the hopefulness with which this Congress separated, as the disturbing events of the next two years caused the trust in the cohesion of the Concert gradually to give way.

D.—THE CONGRESSES OF TROPPAU
AND LAIBACH

1820–1821

POLITICAL AGITATION IN EUROPE. THE CARLSBAD
AND VIENNA CONGRESSES, AND THE VIENNA
FINAL ACT

IN France, after the fall of Richelieu in December, 1818, the violence of party feeling had increased again, and, while the Ultra-royalists refused to abandon their aspirations, the elections of September, 1819, seated in the Chamber a body of thirty-five uncompromising Liberals or Radicals. The counsels of the Great Powers began to breathe alarm; Metternich doubted whether steps should not be taken for the supervision of French affairs by an agency specially appointed for the purpose; and a Russian proposal suggested the revival of permanent Ambassadorial Conferences at Paris. The murder of the Duc de Berry (February, 1820), in whom were centred the hopes of the Bourbon dynasty and those of the extreme Royalists, infuriated that party and seemed to render any attempt at compromise hopeless. Richelieu's return to power, at this time, was unhappily accompanied by repressive measures (including the restoration of the censorship of the Press) which seemed forced upon him by Bonapartist and Republican agitation and by the spread of secret societies (*Charbonnerie*) little in accordance with the genius of French political life. But his adminis-

tration, supported by a combination of the Right and Centre, was both moderate in spirit and constructive in action. Within two years, however, it came to an end, and the extreme Royalists, as will be seen, were once more in power, under the skilful guidance of Comte de Villèle, with ~~Vicomte~~ (afterwards Duc) Matthieu de Montmorency in charge of Foreign Affairs.

The joint policy of the Great Powers can hardly be said to have been affected by the course of events in England; but, though the agitation which marked these years at home was mainly due to the social grievances of the labouring classes, it was no doubt influenced by the revolutionary movements which pervaded a great part of the European continent, and the apprehensions excited by them. The Six Acts (1819), which mark the height of the Reaction in this country, amounted to a less formidable infringement of personal freedom and civic rights than did the corresponding measures in France and Germany; but their success in repressing popular aspirations was even more transitory, and came to an end with the beginnings of the great and ultimately successful effort for Parliamentary Reform.

In Germany, political events continued to cause anxiety to the Governments of the states both great and small, and, more especially, to Metternich, whose ascendancy in the counsels of one and all of them had never before been so commanding. On the one hand, he had succeeded in impressing King Frederick William III., whom he met at Töplitz in July, 1819, with the necessity of curbing, in his own monarchy, the Constitutional movement

which was making rapid progress in some of the lesser states; on the other, rigorous proceedings were taken against the more widespread demand for popular changes, of which the Universities (Jena most conspicuously) were the *focus* and the Radical Press the mouthpiece. This agitation the authorities did not fail to bring into direct connexion with such excesses as the murder, in March, 1819, of the dramatist Ketzebue, denounced as a Russian spy. A period of ‘demagogic persecution’ at once set in, which long left its mark on the public and private life of northern and central Germany.

The Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle had left over certain outstanding German questions to be settled at Frankfort; but, after the Töplitz meetings, Metternich and Hardenberg had (August 1st) drawn up a ‘Punctuation’ for a special meeting, to be held at Carlsbad, where the matters calling for immediate attention (the state of the Universities, the Press and the territorial Constitutions) were to be considered by plenipotentiaries of Austria, and Prussia, and specially invited Ministers of the German Governments. The Conference met without delay, and speedily arrived at several drastic conclusions —a uniform law for the control of the Press and, above all, the appointment of a Central Commission (at Mainz) to deal with the treasonable agitation supposed to be pervading Germany at large. On the subject of state Constitutions, unanimity could not be reached, and the settlement of details was adjourned to a public Ministerial Conference to be held at Vienna. The ‘Decrees’ adopted at Carlsbad were passed by the Federal Diet on September 20th. The Vienna Conferences opened

in the following November, and finished their work in the following spring, when—on May 24th, 1820—the Frankfort Diet adopted the so-called ‘Vienna Final Act’ as the completion or coping-stone of the Federal Act of 1815. As to state Constitutions, it failed to provide for any very marked advance on the general obligation imposed in the Federal Act; and, for the rest, no additions of vital importance were made to the Constitutional provisions contained in it. But the question had been got out of the way; and the Federal Diet had unanimously adopted the Constitutional policy commended to it by the two Great Powers. In the matter of the ‘demagogic,’ or supposed demagogic, movement, Austria, with Prussia at her back, had carried out her policy of repression, without any reference to the Powers under whose guarantee as signatories of the Act of the Vienna Congress the Germanic Constitution lay. Against the reactionary proceedings of the two German Great Powers, neither the British nor (after some hesitation) the French had entered into any protest. As to Russia, and the conclusions of Alexander, there were doubts which left Metternich unsatisfied. La Harpe’s day seemed over, and the effect of the murder of Kotzebue and of Metternich’s persuasiveness was not likely to be counteracted by the Liberal King of Württemberg’s visit to the Tsar at Warsaw. But Capo d’Istria had his reasons for censuring the action of the Great German Powers, and appealed to Castlereagh, who, though approving of the repressive action of Austria and Prussia, warned them to beware of irritating their neighbours. In sum, while the two German Great

Powers were more closely united than ever at home, and therefore surer than ever to go together in European affairs, an unmistakable change, most unwelcome to Metternich, had marred the unity of sentiment which had seemed to prevail at the time of the dissolution of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle.

SPAIN AND THE POWERS.

Thus Germany, or rather the German Governments, had, after a fashion, for better or worse settled their affairs by themselves; nor was it in this quarter that the Concert of Europe was, in this period of conflict between the Reaction and its adversaries, to seek to intervene. Not in the centre of Europe, but at its western extremity, the progress of the opposition to 'legitimate' authority first provoked outside intervention on behalf of the order of things held to have been established at Vienna and confirmed at Aix-la-Chapelle. In the Pyrenean peninsula, the quarrel between the two kingdoms (unallayed by the marriage of King Ferdinand with a Portuguese Infanta in 1818) continued; but it could not prevent the violent popular movements pervading the larger from communicating themselves to the lesser. In Spain¹ the return of Ferdinand VII. in 1814 had very speedily been found to signify the beginning of a relentless repression, throughout the

¹ General authorities for this phase of European politics have been already cited; the most picturesque account of the Spanish troubles and of French and Congressional intervention will be found in Châteaubriand's *Congrès de Vérone, Guerre d'Espagne*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1838)—perhaps the most amazingly self-centred work to be found in either historical or political literature.

monarchy, of anything that savoured of Liberalism. The idolised Constitution of 1812, which limited the royal power in all directions, transferred its principal functions to the Cortes themselves. Personal persecutions ensued; discontent spread through the army, always a main *focus* of political agitation in Spain; public security was in danger, and the struggle for independence of the South-American Colonies assumed a more and more alarming character.

In these circumstances, it was impossible for the Spanish Government to maintain the attitude of arrogant self-reliance which had been that of its plenipotentiary at the Vienna Congress. Friendly counsel was not wanting at Madrid. Intimate relations with Great Britain would have seemed a natural consequence of the services rendered to Spain and her dynasty by that Power; but, though the Spanish Government was induced to promise a favourable Commercial Treaty with Great Britain (concluded September, 1817), and renounced for ever the thought of a resumption of the Bourbon *Pacte de Famille* with France, these half-hearted concessions only concealed its coldness towards a Power, in its turn, out of sympathy with the existing Spanish *régime*. On the other hand, Russian influence, everywhere, at this time, ready to 'take the wind out of the sails' of British, which was so often in cooperation with Austrian, policy, found an extremely assiduous agent in Count Tatischeff; and it was due to him that, from 1816 to 1818, a more intelligent and Liberal administration (that of J. L. y Pizarro) came into power at Madrid. But the change could not be

maintained; and, though Great Britain furthered the interests of the Spanish dynasty in the Italian duchies and sought to bring about a satisfactory settlement with Portugal, the Spanish Government proved incapable of improving the state of affairs either at home or abroad. Virtually, all measures of internal reform collapsed, and, in her foreign relations, Spain fell back upon the policy of standing still. No concession was made either to the insurgent Colonies, or to Portugal; and at Aix-la-Chapelle Spain had proved as immovable as she had at Vienna.

THE SPANISH REVOLUTION

The storm signal came at last, in true Spanish fashion, from the army at home. When, on New Year's Day, 1820, Colonel Riego, a staff-officer of the expeditionary force which had been long waiting at Cadiz for orders for South America, proclaimed to his soldiery the Constitution of 1812, the success of the Revolution, long prepared in secret, was assured from the first. On March 9th, King Ferdinand VII., by swearing fidelity to the Constitution imposed upon him, submitted unconditionally to the programme of the *Exaltados*, as the extreme Liberals were called in the Cortes which assembled in July. Though here the *Moderados* prevailed and Riego's 'national army' was disbanded, both parties agreed in the legislation which followed, and which was directed against the preservation of large estates and the continuance of all male monasteries, except of the Mendicant Orders. The King was incapable of lasting resistance; and the reactionaries had nothing to fall

back upon but intrigue. Meanwhile, the social condition of the country had inevitably suffered from the political agitation, which, notwithstanding the chronic ill-will between the two neighbours, had unavoidably spread to Portugal.

THE PORTUGUESE REVOLUTION

This kingdom had suffered severely, both in population and in its agricultural, commercial and industrial condition during the Napoleonic Wars. The royal family had fled to Brazil, of which the mother-country had almost become a dependency, while of her commercial relations with her constant ally Great Britain the latter reaped the chief advantage. The Peace had brought little relief to Portugal, more especially since the continued tension between her and Spain seemed to demand the maintenance of a large armed force, of which the British General (afterwards Viscount) Beresford still remained in command. He had no sympathy with Constitutional ideas, and the result was a conspiracy, of which the discovery, in 1817, led to a series of executions, and to the continuance of angry discontent and secret plotting. When at last (in April, 1820) he sailed for Rio, to concert action at the main seat of Braganza rule, the Revolution broke out behind his back at Oporto. The *junta* established here to carry on affairs united with another, formed for the same purpose at Lisbon, as a Provisional Government (October), and, after Beresford's return from Brazil and departure to England, set about the task of Constitutional reform. Ultimately (not without the use of violence in carrying through the process)

it was agreed to summon a Portuguese Cortes for the adoption (with certain modifications) of the famous Spanish Constitution of 1812. On March 29th, 1821, a majority approved the draft, in a most rigorous form, in spite of strong clerical opposition to the provisions affecting the privileges and property of the Church. When, in July, 1821, King João VI. returned to Lisbon (leaving behind him as Regent in Brazil the ambitious Crown-prince Dom Pedro), he took the oath to the Constitution. Thus here, too, the Revolution seemed to have consummated a victory. It was disquieting to the Great Powers; and more especially to Austria, to whom the established order of things in Europe had been so largely due, and who was pre-eminently anxious to prevent its overthrow in another peninsula, once more subject to her special tutelage.

THE REVOLUTION IN ITALY (THE TWO SICILIES)

Although in Italy the Revolution broke out a few months later than in Spain and in Portugal, the course of events in these three countries forms essentially a connected whole. In Italy, national patriotism, while deeply engrained in the hearts and minds of many of her noblest sons, and provided with concrete terms of expression by the policy of Napoleon, had not yet come to dominate a wide range of popular opinion, or to assume the shape of a definite political design. Neither the idea of a Union or Confederation of Italian States under the Pope or some other head, nor that of an Indivisible Republic, was more than the conception or vision of individual thinkers or dreamers.

On the other hand, the plan of a single monarchical state, to be formed by accretion round the Sardinian kingdom, had hardly as yet found anything beyond isolated expression; and even this seemed deprived of any significance by the fact of the demonstratively reactionary policy of King Victor Emmanuel I. at Turin, whose rule was resented by Genoa, on her being subjected to it by the unsympathetic Congress of Vienna.

The Austrian Government had reason for distrusting the good will of his relative (and later successor) Prince Charles-Albert, of the Savoy-Carignan line; but the hopes of Liberalism resting on him were concerned only with the future; while the consistently intelligent Government of the most important of the 'independent' states of northern Italy, the grand-duchy of Tuscany, contented itself with reviving the traditions of an earlier age of progress and reform. In the Papal States, too, the unselfish kindness of Pope Pius VII., and such perception of the signs of the times as the Cardinal-Secretary Consalvi had shown already at Vienna, seemed at first to promise improvement in the administrative system. But here the form of government itself, with its inevitable consequences, put any real progress out of the question; and secret associations flourished among both the adversaries of the existing *régime* and their opponents. These societies, a truly indigenous growth, which, in the eyes not of the Austrian Government only, became 'the most formidable feature in Italian political life and, as has been seen, spread into other countries, flourished with particular exuberance in the Papal

States. Their original (and perhaps their most enduring) home, however, was Naples, where the next violent outbreak of the Revolution was to occur. The activity of the *Carboneria*, at first in both name and character an *analogon* of Free-masonry in its earlier phases, had, during Murat's reign, taken a political direction, as opposed to the sway of a foreign Prince; but when, in his final struggle, he had proclaimed himself the champion of the unity and independence of Italy, the *Carbonari* made common cause with him; and the reactionary policy of the restored Bourbon Government invested their designs with an unprecedented significance.

King Ferdinand I. (as he was now called), whose long reign as Ferdinand IV. in Sicily had virtually been that of his Consort, Queen Caroline, till her death in 1814, now reunited 'both Sicilies' under his utterly incapable and not less ungenerous sway (December, 1816). The provision made, in the Sicilian Constitution of 1812, for his resignation of one of his thrones, should he come into possession of both, had become a dead letter through an article (CIV.) of the Vienna Act; and, though Sicily was formally promised the preservation of its ancient privileges and was, as a matter of fact, mainly left to its own semi-medieval conditions of life, it became, to most intents and purposes, a dependent province of the Neapolitan kingdom, in whose interests it was governed, or misgoverned. The political and social conditions of Naples itself were at a low ebb. While secret societies abounded, and, in the Abruzzi in particular, banditti defied, or bargained with, the Government, the judicial

system was corrupt, education largely unknown, and the pauperism of the capital and its *Lazzaroni* unmitigated. The Church was eager to improve the advantages which she had gained from the restoration, and which she secured by the Concordat of 1818; and the Army, commanded by General Nugent, an Irishman formerly in the Austrian service, and up to the autumn of 1817 reinforced by Austrian troops, was corroded by a spirit of factiousness and discontent. The former civic militia, by re-embodying which it was attempted to strengthen the regular forces, was found to have been in a large measure ‘penetrated’ by the *Carboneria*, and intent upon that demand for a Constitution with which this association had now identified itself.

Towards the close of 1818, the Constitutional agitation began to recognise as its leader General Guglielmo Pepe, who had taken advantage of successful military operations against the brigands of Foggia and Avellino to fuse the militia under his command with the *Carboneria*, which named him its General and secret leader. The triumph of the Revolution in Spain brought a long period of expectancy to a sudden consummation. On July 3rd, 1820, the *Carbonari* of Avellino and its vicinity proclaimed the Spanish Constitution of 1812. Pepe cast in his lot with the insurgents; and, on July 7th, the militia marched upon the palace at Naples. Here, the terrified King gave way at once, accepting the Constitution, to which army and militia took oath.¹ A Provisional Govern-

¹ A translation of this document from the Spanish had been furnished with all speed.

ment, made up of *Carbonari* and *Muratists*, was formed, to which the King renewed his pledge. Till a parliament should meet, Pepe was master of the situation; though there were ominous signs of disunion, and much fear as to the bearing foreign Governments, and the Austrian in particular, would adopt towards the successful Revolution. Meanwhile, King Ferdinand, suspicious even of his heir the Duke of Calabria, into whose hands as Governor-General he had resigned his power, and who played the Liberal, remained shut up in his palace, feigning sickness and secretly communicating with Metternich.

When the news of the adoption of the Spanish or ‘Cortes’ Constitution reached Messina, the population joined in the enthusiasm of the garrison (which included many *Carbonari*); but in the Sicilian capital, Palermo, where a sinister manifestation followed (July 14th), a counter-movement ensued in favour of the Sicilian Constitution of the same year (1812), as the symbol of Sicilian independence. Although, after a Terror of some days, a Provisional Government was established, wild disturbances ensued in different parts of the island.

In the end (October 5th), an agreement was concluded, by which the Neapolitan army held possession of the fortifications of Palermo, while the conflict concerning the Constitutions was settled by a compromise. The Spanish Constitution, sworn to by the King, was to be valid for Sicily as well as for Naples, but with such modifications as a joint or separate parliament should approve. The decision as to which kind of parliament should be

summoned was to be left to an assembly of Sicilian deputies.¹ But so impotent a conclusion could not stand. At Naples, the Parliament had been opened by the King, and though G. Pepe had laid down his dictatorship, he retained the control of the militias and the capital, and the King made his way back to his country retreat. But, when the Sicilian agreement contrived by F. Pepe came up for discussion, it was rejected, and General Colletta, sent to Sicily in his place, had to use force and keep masses of troops under arms at Palermo. Thus, the kingdom of the Two Sicilies was once more split in twain, at the very moment when the intervention of the Concert of Europe was once more to descend upon it.

THE POWERS AND THE REVOLUTION

Tsar Alexander, commissioned as he deemed himself to be with the supreme task of watching over the destinies of Europe at large, and more and more convinced that 'Jacobinism' was at present the foe to face, had been the first member of the Pentarchy to advocate resistance to the approach of the Revolution. A week before the acceptance by Ferdinand VII., on March 9th, 1820, of the 'Cortes' Constitution imposed upon him through Riego's successful rising, he had urged that advantage should be taken of the Conference of Ambassadors, then sitting at Paris on the chronic troubles between Spain and Portugal, to agree on common action by the Powers with regard to this insurrection. Wellington, however, who was afterwards very

¹ This complicated agreement was concluded between Palermo and G. Pepe's brother Florestan.

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anxious lest the Spanish revolutionary agitation should spread to the neighbouring kingdom, regarded Riego's as merely one of the military risings indigenous to the Spanish soil; and nothing was done at the time. But, when King Ferdinand's submissive acceptance of the Constitution became known, the French Government, deeply disturbed as it had been by the assassination of the Duc de Berry, became, in its turn, much agitated, and was with difficulty prevented from interfering by sending a special mission to Spain. The Tsar, while suggesting a Conference at Paris on French affairs (to which neither Castlereagh nor Metternich would agree), proposed to the Spanish ambassador at Paris the despatch of a joint note of dissatisfaction, and, in case the Cortes refused to establish a fair Constitutional Government in place of that in existence, intervention by the Powers. Hereupon, the British Government roundly declared that the Alliance of the Four Powers had not been designed as a combination for the rule of the world or for the supervision of the internal affairs of particular states. Metternich's distrust of Russian policy even made him unwilling to let the discussion among the Powers be made public property. Thus, for the moment, the Revolution in Spain was allowed to run its course, and no action was taken to prevent the success of that in Portugal.

But, when, a few weeks earlier than the beginning of the movement in Portugal, the Revolution broke out in Nápoles, whatever suspicions Metternich might feel of Russian designs, Austrian interests, as he viewed them, were directly involved, and he could not look on in quiet. Military precautions

were taken by Austria, and the Italian Governments, from Turin to Rome, were informed of her determination to maintain, as she was bound to do by the Treaties of 1815, the tranquillity of the peninsula. And, without any secret being made of Austria's hostility to the new *régime* at Naples, a personal request for a mutual understanding was addressed by the Emperor Francis to the Tsar. But neither from him nor from the French Government could Metternich, although assured both of the approval of Prussia, and of no objection being raised against Austrian intervention by Great Britain, obtain an assent to any action not proceeding from the entire Concert of Europe. The French Government was jealous of the ascendancy of Austrian influence in Italy, more especially in the Bourbon monarchy of the south; and the Tsar, who would have liked to send a Russian army across the Alps, was resolved not to forego a leading share in a European intervention, although it would have suited Austria best to take upon herself the suppression of the Revolution, with the approval, and, as it were, in the name, of the Allied Powers of Europe. Thus, in the end, Alexander was ready to fall back on the French proposal of a Congress of Princes or their Ministers, to discuss the Neapolitan question; and Metternich, who at first demurred and then would have had it meet at Vienna, was at least successful in having its place of assembly fixed at Troppau, a small town of historic name in Austrian Silesia.

THE CONGRESS OF TROPPAU. THE PRELIMINARY
PROTOCOL

Though the British Government had shown no sympathy with the Neapolitan revolutionary movement, neither it nor the director of its foreign policy, Castlereagh, could accept the principle laid down by the Tsar (which it would certainly not have been easy to illustrate from British history), that, to be accounted satisfactory, constitutions must be granted by the Crown. Castlereagh, indeed, plainly asserted that an unlimited extension of the objects of the Alliance, as established in 1815 and renewed in 1818, could only result in its ‘moving away from us, without our having abandoned it.’ Lord Stewart, British ambassador at Vienna, on being sent to Troppau, was, accordingly, instructed either to take the resolutions of the Congress *ad referendum*, or to sign the protocols with a reservation. The French Government, although it had first suggested the Congress, thought it safer to instruct its plenipotentiaries to follow, virtually, the example of the British; and Metternich was thus, to all intents and purposes, left face to face with the Tsar, with whom, notwithstanding the Liberalising activity of Capo d’Istria, he prevailed. The causes of this success are, no doubt, partly to be found in Metternich’s ability, self-confidence and good luck, but, above all, in the rapid progress of Alexander’s conversion to the cause of the Counter-revolution, expanded by his imagination into that of civilisation against anarchy.¹

¹ He seems, according to Châteaubriand (whose apology for him is both elaborate and candid), to have had a personal *pique* against King Louis XVIII.

The revolutionary conspiracy discovered at Paris (August), and the ingratitude with which the Warsaw Diet had met some of the measures imposed upon it ‘from above,’ helped to bring the Tsar to Troppau in a most amicable mood towards Metternich and his policy, though at first the Austrian and the Russian proposals were not altogether uniform.

The Congress opened on October 20th, 1820. In substance, Metternich asked for the assent of the Powers to the despatch of a sufficient body of Austrian troops to Naples. Approved by Hardenberg for Prussia, this proposal met with a divided reception on the part of the two plenipotentiaries of France, whose Government was still speculating on the possibilities of a French or Russian mediation—or by one conducted by both these two Powers—for the revision of the obnoxious Constitution adopted at Naples. Capo d'Istria desired that Austrian intervention on behalf of Europe should be limited to seeking to bring about a condition of things approved by the King and in accordance with the wishes of the people; but Metternich insisted upon the necessity of the existing *régime* ceasing before the liberated King was advised by the Powers as to future legislation. Hereupon (November 7th), Russia arrived at a confidential understanding with Austria and Prussia amounting to a practical approval of the course outlined by Austria. While Great Britain held aloof, and France, at least for the moment, abstained from action, the three Eastern Powers,¹ on November 19th, agreed among themselves upon a Pre-

¹ King Frederick William III. had arrived late at Troppau, where he had hitherto been represented by his son, the Crown-prince.

liminary Protocol, which, representing as it did a notable combination of principles of action, is of considerable moment in the history of the Congresses of this age. It purported that any state hitherto forming part of the European Alliance was to be temporarily excluded from it, if an insurrectionary movement in that state had led to changes in its system of government imperilling the well-being of other states. In cases of immediate danger, the Alliance was to be entitled, if friendly steps proved in vain, to bring back the offending state into it by the use of force. As applied to the present condition of the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, this ‘principle’ was asserted to imply the temporary occupation of it by an Austrian army, and King Ferdinand was to be invited to attend the Congress, which, with this intent, was to be removed further south to Laibach, where the situation would be considered anew.¹

DISSENT OF THE WESTERN POWERS. METTER-NICH'S CONFIDENCE

But, however near, in logical sequence, the ‘principles’ of the Troppau Preliminary Protocol came to those of the Pentarchy, as established at Aix-la-Chapelle, and to the ideas at the root of the Holy Alliance itself, their application proved to be beset by the greatest difficulties. And, in the result, the formulation of these ‘principles,’ instead of, as it had been hoped, consolidating the Pentarchy, gave rise to the first manifestation of a

¹ The principles of this Protocol were solemnly reasserted by the Convention of Berlin between Austria, Prussia and Russia bearing date October 15th, 1833.

fundamental difference within it. The document, signed by the Three Powers as a draft, was communicated to the British and French Governments, with an expression of confident expectation of their assent. But the French Government, while readily approving of the consideration shown to the Bourbon King of the Two Sicilies by inviting his attendance at the Congress, could not reconcile itself to the assertion of a right of internal intervention which might subject Spain and (what was more) France itself to the same treatment as that which it was proposed to apply in southern Italy —to military occupation, in a word. When these objections were prematurely made known to Alexander, they deeply stirred his wrath. But a more outspoken protest came from Great Britain. Inasmuch as the British Parliament was even more certain than were the French Chambers to find fault with the policy of the Protocol, Castlereagh could speak plainly. While making no secret of his goodwill towards the Austrian design of suppressing the Neapolitan Revolution, he announced the intention of his Government to resist the attempt of the Eastern Powers to deduce from the settlement of Vienna and the Alliance on which it was based 'an abstract rule of interference in the internal affairs of independent states.' When the Three Powers, on December 8th, issued a circular despatch explanatory of their views and intentions, Castlereagh replied by a Memorandum, dated December 16th, which stated at length the grounds on which Great Britain refused her assent to the Protocol, and demurred to the Troppau 'code of international police.'

A final attempt was made by Capo d'Istria to bring about the close of the quarrel between the King of the Two Sicilies and his subjects through the mediation of Pope Pius VII.; and Metternich had no objection to this device, since it was as harmless as it was belated. The King's Ministers had, in vain, sought to persuade the Neapolitan Parliament to meet the irate Powers halfway by modifying the obnoxious Constitution into one of a less radical type; the answer was the overthrow of the Ministry, and the injunction imposed upon King Ferdinand, in return for the permission granted him to attend the Congress, to make no use of the occasion except for the maintenance of the Constitution as it stood. Self-delusion on the one side, and cunning on the other, could not further go; and, on December 18th, King Ferdinand started his journey. When, about Christmastide, the news of his departure reached Troppau, the dissolution of the Congress there followed straightway.

Metternich's policy had been, in the main, successful; and, for the time at least, his ascendancy over the mind of the Tsar had been very palpably established, in spite of the Liberalising counsels of Capo d'Istria. The unity of both design and action on the part of the three Eastern Powers had never before been so close. On the other hand, while the bearing of France had necessarily alienated much of the goodwill which Alexander had been anxious to display towards her, the British Government, without in the least wishing to break through the general concurrence between its foreign policy and that of the Austrian, had made

clear the limits of its own cooperation in the Concert, of which Metternich had at Troppau more than ever shown himself to be the guiding spirit. The hope of Alexander, that all the Powers would agree to guarantee legitimate sovereignty in Europe, had been disappointed; but Metternich, sure of the Tsar's goodwill and well satisfied with King Frederick William's willingness to postpone *sine die* the fulfilment of the hopes of Prussian Liberalism, could confidently sound the note of the necessity of a close agreement between the Three Powers as the epitome of the lesson learnt by them at Troppau.

REASSEMBLING OF THE CONGRESS AT LAIBACH. BRITISH CIRCULAR NOTE

The same was even more emphatically the line of action which it was endeavoured to lay down at Laibach. Here, in the capital of the Austrian province of Carniola, the Congress, early in January, 1821, reassembled in larger numbers than those in which it had met at Troppau. In accordance with the Tsar's wish, all the Italian Governments had been invited to send representatives; although these were not admitted to the deliberations till the main question—the Neapolitan—had been settled. King Ferdinand arrived without loss of time, accompanied by Prince Russo-Scilla, formerly ambassador at Vienna and a resolute reactionary. The King now openly took up an attitude which the Neapolitan Parliament had failed to foresee: he regarded himself as no longer bound by the promises made by him to the ‘assassins’ out of whose hands he had escaped. As for the Tsar,

who at Laibach seemed completely fascinated by the personal influence of Metternich, he made no secret of his hope that the action which Austria had taken it upon herself to pursue at Naples might be followed by similar intervention in Spain on the part of France. The French plenipotentiaries soon finding that, with the Italian Governments represented at the Congress, the fear of the spread of the Revolution overpowered that of an increase of Austrian influence—the Papal Government alone abstaining, with well-calculated reserve, from committing itself to any approval of the policy of the Eastern Powers—took care themselves not to fall out with it. For they were aware that any opposition to the action of Austria and her confederates would stir the wrath of the ultra royalist faction at home in France, elated by their success in the recent elections (of November, 1820). Thus, it was left to Castlereagh, however little he and his colleagues might object to the suppression of the Revolution at Naples, to repeat the British protest against the Troppau Protocol in a Circular Note, dated January 19th, 1821. This document, as the first intimation of the actual condition of things which reached the public ear, a storm of indignation in Parliament the action of the Powers. Hereupon, roundly condemned the particular revolution had led to the imbroglio, but at the same time expressed a hope that Great Britain would not be called upon to interfere in it.

¹ The speech in Parliament in which Castlereagh thus defined his policy was made on February 21st, 1821, and was the last ever delivered by him.

AUSTRIAN INTERVENTION AT NAPLES

The Duke of Gallo was now sent to Naples with a letter announcing the condemnation by the Congress of the Revolution and its works, endorsed by King Ferdinand; and, without delay, an Austrian army of 60,000 men set out to cross the Po. The Congress was invited by Austria to approve a document regulating the military occupation of the southern kingdom, which was not to extend over more than three years, and which might eventually involve the Allies in certain financial liabilities. Prussia, with characteristic caution, hesitated to go so far, and France held aloof. But the Tsar cordially approved of these proposals, and Metternich resolved to take a further step, and suggest to King Ferdinand a draft Fundamental Law for the Two Sicilies, separating their administrations and entirely doing away with representative assemblies in either country. The draft, having been accepted by the King, was submitted by Ruffo to the Congress, and adopted by it, the French plenipotentiaries acquiescing and the British merely taking the document *ad referendum*. Metternich's policy had thus, with the full consent of the Tsar, been entirely successful. But he prudently abstained from seeking to extend it to the perfectly analogous case of Spain, until in neighbouring France the ascendancy of the ultra-royalist faction should have been completely assured. Within a few weeks, after a feeble resistance on the part of the Neapolitan army and its subsequent disbandment, the Austrians entered Naples (March 24th, 1821), and the Revolution in southern Italy came to an inglorious end.

REVOLUTION AND INTERVENTION IN PIEDMONT

Shortly before this, however, the news reached Laibach that a movement of the same kind had broken out in Piedmont, where the conservatism of Victor Emmanuel I.'s rule had been deemed a sufficient safeguard against any Constitutional or anti-Austrian agitation. On March 12th, the King abdicated in favour of his brother Charles Felix; and, on the following day, the 'Cortes' Constitution was proclaimed, and, in the absence of the new sovereign, the young Prince Charles Albert, of the Savoy-Carignan line, the heir-presumptive to the throne, on whom the Liberals built high hopes, assumed the regency. At Laibach, the two Emperors, with the assent of the Prussian plenipotentiary, at once resolved upon armed intervention, as indispensable in order to prevent any cooperation of the French 'Jacobins' with the Piedmontese Revolution and, above all, its spread into Lombardy. Together with the hesitation and ultimate refusal of Prince Charles Albert to incur responsibility for the new order of things, the energetic action of Austria brought about the collapse of the entire movement. On July 24th, the three Eastern Powers at Laibach concluded a treaty with the Sardinian Government, which fixed the number of the Austrian occupying force at 12,000 men. The small 'Constitutional' army was broken near Novara; and Alessandria was occupied by Austrian troops. Once more, without a single soldier of the armada which Alexander prided himself on holding always in readiness having crossed the frontier, his Austrian ally had mastered

the Revolution. Charles Felix, who had denounced the proclamation of the Constitution as an act of rebellion, was in definite possession of the regal authority, while Charles Albert, who resigned the regency in March, 1823, withdrew in semi-exile to Florence.

While, in Piedmont, the victory of the Reaction, thus established in most respects, stopped short of extreme severity, such was not the case at Naples. Here, Francis Duke of Calabria had, unlike Charles Albert of Savoy-Carignan, by his retention of the regency covered his secret agreement with the principles of his father's system of government. In anticipation, however, of his return from Laibach, King Ferdinand had committed the conduct of affairs at Naples to a Provisional Government, which openly undid all the public measures of the last nine months, and alarmed Metternich himself by the brutality of its proceedings. On May 15th, 1821, the King held his entry into his capital, where he disbanded the remains of the Neapolitan army, and set about the foundation of a new one, under the temporary protection of the Austrian forces on both sides of the Straits of Messina.

DECLARATION OF LAIBACH: THE *Triple Entente*

Before these arrangements were carried to a definite conclusion, the two Austrian and Russian plenipotentiaries at Laibach, with the concurrence of the Prussian, issued a Declaration (May 12th, 1821), in which the three 'Allied Sovereigns' took to themselves the credit of having preserved Europe from the peril of a general Revolution.

This late effort of Gentz's indefatigable pen amounted, at the same time, to a recital of the 'eternal truth,' that salutary legislative and administrative changes in the several states should emanate only from those on whom a Divine Providence has imposed the responsibility for the use of the authority entrusted to them, and to an admission that those who at present accepted this responsibility were the three Eastern Powers only. And the south of Europe knew, as did the north, that, of these Powers, it was Austria whose choice and policy had inspired and directed the course which had been taken, and whose armies had secured the triumph of the Reaction in Italy. A European Trias—or *Triple Entente*—had thus begun to supersede the European Pentarchy—or Concert; and the schism between the three Eastern and the two Western Powers, and Great Britain in especial, had already announced itself to those who had eyes to see. But would Metternich, supposing him to remain assured of Prussian support, continue to command the goodwill and cooperation of Russia in the future—a future which the first signs of the Greek Insurrection were already beginning to cloud? For these signs implied the reopening of the Eastern Question, as to which the policy of Russia and that of Austria had so long gone asunder.

E.—THE CONGRESS OF VERONA¹

1822]

RUSSIA AND THE PORTE

IT was not, as it proved, the Greek Insurrection which, at the next European Congress, was to provoke the immediate intervention of the Great Powers. The outbreak of this Insurrection (1821) had been the inevitable consequence of the concessions which, after the Serbian revolt of 1815, Milosh Obrenovitch had secured for his country from the Sultan (1820), and which had marked the beginning of a process destined to occupy a century in its accomplishment—the break-up of the Ottoman empire in Europe. The Greek Insurrection, whose course cannot be pursued here, in 1821 overspread a wide area of both

¹ As to the Congress of Verona and connected events, see Stern, *op. cit.*, vol. ii., chapter ix., with those immediately preceding and following; and W. A. Phillips, *op. cit.*, vi. 3-7. Cf. Metternich, *Mémoires*, vol. iii. (1881), *année* 1822. It is impossible, even at this time of day, not to be fascinated by the literary charm of Chateaubriand's *Congrès de Vérone, Guerre d'Espagne*, etc. (2 vols., Paris, 1838); and the work is full of fine thoughts and acute characterisations; but though it necessarily contains much curious information, with many original letters, it must, as already indicated, be regarded as a chapter of high-flown autobiography rather than of careful political history. Those who read it for the first time should, if possible, read with it Lady Blessinghassett's admirable monograph on *Chateaubriand* (Mainz, 1903). H. W. V. Temperley's *George Canning* (1905) contains a valuable chapter 'The Congress of Verona.' J. E. Green, in 'Castlereagh's Instructions for the Vienna Conferences of 1822' (*Transactions of the R. Hist. Soc.*, vol. vii., 1913), seeks to vindicate Castlereagh's political insight at the expense of Canning's candour.

land and sea, and led to terrible reprisals, which, together with the vengeance taken by the Turks for a rising in Wallachia, seemed to make Russian interference certain. On June 28th of that year, Alexander, moved, it must be allowed, by the most generous impulses of his nature, but also, once more, under the joint influence of Mme. de Krüdener and Capo d'Istria (whom Metternich called ‘the fatal element of eternal discord’), issued a wrathful manifesto purporting that the cause now espoused by Russia was one common to Europe at large. Unless Turkey, he added, gave satisfaction by changing her whole system of rule, she had forfeited all claim to coexist any longer with the Christian Powers of Europe. At the same time, the Tsar showed every disposition to adhere to the lines of action laid down at Laibach. In a letter to the Emperor Francis (July 11th), he promised, unless the Porte refused his demands, not to enter into hostilities without a previous understanding with the other European sovereigns, and called upon the Emperor to guarantee to them the purity of his—the Tsar’s—intentions. Metternich, though out of sympathy with the Greeks (whose revolt, whatever its distinctive features, he regarded as, nevertheless, identical in origin with the previous manifestations of the Revolution), felt himself obliged to address some serious advice to the Porte. But it had no effect, since the Turks perceived that Austria forbore from any action of a collective kind or in conjunction with Russia. The endeavours of Castlereagh (now Lord Londonderry), who shared Metternich’s apprehensions of Russia’s ultimate designs, seemed equally hopeless; and

the summons of a Congress, or at least of a Conference of Ambassadors at Vienna, found no favour, for the present, at Petersburg. Still, Metternich persisted. The French Government, which the Tsar was believed to have sought to gain over to his Eastern policy by the offer of eventual Mediterranean acquisitions, hesitated to join in action against the Porte, the old ally of France. The Prussian Government, notwithstanding Ancillon's early Philhellenist manifesto, held firmly by its Austrian ally. And, with Great Britain, Metternich, after an interview with King George IV. and Londonderry at Hanover in October, 1821, arrived at so close an understanding, that he felt himself warranted in making a fresh appeal to the Tsar (December) on behalf of the principles of that 'general Alliance' of which he had so long posed as the mainstay. In a Memorandum, dated October 23rd, he defined the policy of Austria as the maintenance of peace on the basis of existing Treaties; and, a few days later (28th), Castlereagh asserted the necessity of maintaining the present state of Europe—of which Turkey as it stood formed part. Alexander was, however, not yet to be moved, being confirmed in his attitude by the virtual refusal of the Porte to accept the Four Points pressed upon it by Austria and Great Britain: they amounted to a concession of the Russian demands as to the Danubian Principalities and the protection of the religious worship of the Porte's Christian subjects. Thus, for the time there was a standstill; and Alexander's Eastern designs remained in conflict with his ideal of a general European Concert.

THE GREEK INSURRECTION AND THE POWERS.

Meanwhile, the Greek Insurrection ran its course up to the Declaration of Greek Independence in January, 1822, and thence to the battle of Peta in the following July, which seemed to threaten the downfall of the national cause in the whole of western Greece, and eventually in the Morea. Manifestly, as the struggle appeared to be approaching its catastrophe, the prospect of intervention by the Great Powers waned, and the Tsar's eagerness to aid an insurrection which was, under his protection, to have secured a victory of the Cross over the Crescent began to cool. Early in the year, he sent to Vienna an able agent, de Tatischeff, to discuss the chances of inducing the Porte, by diplomatic pressure, to make concessions short of the Four Points. Metternich, trusting to his understanding with Great Britain, had met the Russian policy so far as to promise to recall the Austrian ambassador from Constantinople, if the same step were taken by all the members of the 'Grand Alliance.' The future relations of the Porte to its Christian subjects Metternich desired to have discussed in Conferences between the Powers and the Porte at Vienna, to be followed by a Congress at the same place. These Conferences had actually begun at the end of June, when Tatischeff reappeared, to announce the willingness of his Government still further to reduce its '*ultimatum*.' The evacuation of the Danubian Principalities, beyond which, practically, no demand was now made, had, as a matter of fact, been already promised by the Porte to the British ambassador,

Lord Strangford. But, though new and acceptable hospodars were sent into the Principalities, the evacuation was delayed, in approved Turkish fashion; and when, in August, Strangford arrived from Constantinople at Vienna, to take part in the Congress which was to assemble there, he brought with him no more categorical assurance than a promise from the Porte to sacrifice everything, except its dignity and independence, to the friendship of Great Britain.

Still, with British aid, Austria had succeeded in staving off the direct intervention of Russia, or of the Powers under Russia's guidance, in the affairs of the East. In the previous month (July) Capo d'Istria's fall had put an end to fears of his policy prevailing at the Vienna Congress. The Greek Insurrection lay low; and the Tsar, intent upon repressing the Revolution elsewhere, was fain to confess that he had never mistaken the impure source of the movement which he had favoured, or the danger in which his intervention would have involved his allies. In other words, the autocrat had at last been 'brought into line.'

SPANISH AFFAIRS, AND THE QUESTION OF FRENCH INTERVENTION

Very different had been the course of events in Spain, to whose revolutionary movement Metternich had persuaded himself, and sought to persuade the Tsar, that the Greek Insurrection was essentially akin. Ferdinand VII., forced to consent to the dismissal of his life-guards, as a preliminary step to their disbandment, was more helpless than ever;

and, though he brought about the dismissal of one Ministry of Constitutionalists (*Moderados*), had to accept another, equally obnoxious to himself, at the hands of the Cortes. In secret, he was soliciting foreign aid, though, as yet, the French Government steadily refused to intervene. In the Extraordinary Cortes, opened in the autumn of 1821, the Radicals (*Exaltados*) prevailed, and gave their support to the resistance to the Government offered at Cadiz, Seville and Coruña. Early in 1822, the Ministry was forced to resign, and the Extraordinary Cortes were soon afterwards closed, without any real decision as to the political situation having been reached. The risings in the south had begun to quiet down; but Radical feeling was unsatisfied, while, especially in rural districts, the Conservatives (*Serviles*) could more than ever count on the apathy of the masses and the goodwill of the clergy. And their hopes of putting an end to the whole 'Constitutional' business, and bringing to pass the restoration of the absolute monarchy, were greatly encouraged by the prospect of the victory of the same cause on the other side of the Pyrenees.

The Congress of Laibach had borne witness to the prudent and patriotic determination of the Richelieu Ministry in France, notwithstanding the pressure exercised upon it from both sides, to preserve neutrality with regard to Spanish affairs. The course of events at home, however, had gradually come to exert its irresistible influence. The success of the ultra-royalists in the autumn election of 1820 had already led to the inclusion in the Ministry of two prominent members of their faction, Comtes de Villèle and de Corbière; but this

had failed to content the extreme section. In the end, the further demand for the appointment of the Duc de Belluno as Minister of War led to a rupture between Richelieu and the '*Congréganistes*,' as the fanatics of ultra-royalism were called (they were supported by a religious propaganda, as well as by the influence of Mme. de Caylas over Louis XVIII.). When the autumn elections of 1821 had proved largely in favour of the ultras, Richelieu had to give way, and, after a useless appeal to the good faith of the Comte d'Artois (heir-presumptive to the throne), whose persuasion had induced him to take office, sent in his resignation, in which his ministerial colleagues joined (December). The new Villèle-Corbière Ministry, which represented the extreme Royalist faction gathered round the person of the Comte d'Artois, included Vicomte Mathieu de Montmorency, a convert from Constitutionalism and a devoted adherent of the policy of Intervention. The temporary alliance with the Left, formed to bring about the fall of Richelieu, was at once broken. The numbers of the adversaries of the Bourbon throne, in consequence, at once increased, while the *Carboneria* spread through the country and produced a series of conspiracies. Delations, persecutions and executions, with other measures of repression, followed, and a 'White Terror' seemed, once more, to reign in France.

What wonder, that the eyes of King Ferdinand VII. and the Spanish *Serviles* should have turned expectantly across the frontier, although, at first, the new French Ministry seemed loth to abandon the non-intervention policy of its pre-

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decessor, or to interfere in Spain on its own responsibility? Advantage was, however, taken of the spread of yellow fever in Catalonia, and the consequent muster of a large body of French troops on the frontier (August, 1821), for the purpose of protecting the mountain-passes against the penetration of the epidemic into France, to detain these troops there, even after it had abated; so that the *cordon sanitaire* was gradually changed into the presence of an army of observation. Thus matters stood, when, in March, 1822, the new Cortes met, and a *Moderados* Ministry (under Martinez de la Rosa) faced both a Radical majority and the insuperable animosity of the partisans of absolute royalty, strong in the support of large sections of the population and in the secret favour of the King.

To crown all, the quarrel with the South-American Colonies had now reached a hopeless stage. Spain had, in 1816, lost her last opportunity of reestablishing her rule over these Colonies on the basis of reforms satisfactory to the great body of their populations; and, from that date onwards, encouraged by the goodwill and the mercantile interests of the United States, Great Britain and Portugal, the Insurrection continuously progressed. Independent republics were now formed in several of these Colonies. The Spanish Government would not hear of transaction with the insurgents, and in 1820, as was incidentally mentioned above, was preparing an armed expedition from Cadiz, when Spain itself was plunged into revolutionary agitation. In vain, Great Britain, whose trade Spanish retaliatory proceedings were more and more

seriously affecting, urged a pacific solution of the quarrel; and in March, 1821, the United States recognised the independence of those of the Spanish South-American Colonies which had already proclaimed it.

Thus the impotence of Spain seemed to declare itself on every side. Though, in May, 1822, an attempt at an Absolutist *coup d'état* failed, the *Moderados* Ministry was, in the end, unable to hold its own against the desperate plotting which ensued, probably with the secret encouragement of the King, who had not dared to follow the larger number of his guards to his country seat. When, on July 7th, they returned in order to seize the capital on his behalf, they were overpowered, and he was to all intents and purposes a prisoner in his palace. A Radical Ministry was with difficulty formed, and vengeance taken on those who had taken part in the secret conspiracy. On the other hand, in the north, guerilla bands of adherents of absolute government continuously spread; and at Seo de Urgel, at the base of the Pyrenees, a Regency was formally established in the name of the legitimate King, which declared the annulment of all measures passed since the proclamation of the 'Cortes' Constitution.

Arrogant self-confidence marked the proceedings of this Regency, after the manner of many Spanish Governments, *juntas* and 'pronouncements.' But, though before long all Catalonia (with the exception of the larger towns), as well as Navarre and part of Aragon, adhered to the counter-revolution, its real dependence was on foreign aid. None was to be expected from Great Britain against

Liberalism and the Madrid Government, whom she was willing enough to advise to make peace with the South-American Colonies. But the Tsar, who, so early as the spring of 1822, had been plied by King Ferdinand of the Two Sicilies in favour of his brother-in-law and namesake at Madrid, listened with marked favour to this urgent appeal, and recurred to the idea of sending across the Pyrenees a force of 40,000, as the Russian contingent to a 'European Army.' Metternich, though by no means blind to the effect which the degrading position of Ferdinand VII. must have upon the cause of Legitimacy and order, shrank from any share in the designs of the Tsar, and looked with suspicion upon the close understanding between Russia and France which they seemed to imply. From this point of view, too, as well as because it was on her rulers that the Spanish absolutists primarily depended, the action of France was the all-important element in the situation.

Conscious of this, the French Government, at the outset, showed great caution in its proceedings. Before taking any step in the direction of intervention, Montmorency asked for a declaration on the part of the King of Spain, that he would not refuse to renounce part of the royal power which he had possessed in 1814. Such a declaration would enable the French Ministers to make it known to their Chambers and army that he had assented to reforms reconciling the rights of his crown with the lawful liberties of his people; whereupon, supposing King Ferdinand to have succeeded in retiring into one of his provinces

and then approaching the French frontier at the head of a loyal body of troops, the French Government might appropriately take into consideration the question of mediation. But, although a guarded statement to the above effect was accompanied by an autograph letter of advice in the same sense from King Louis XVIII., and although Montmorency ventured to add the unwarranted assertion (afterwards denounced by Metternich), that the view here developed was shared by the Allied Courts, Ferdinand VII. would, at first, have none of it. What he desiderated was nothing short of the restitution of his unlimited royal authority; and, even after the *coup manqué* of July 7th, he would not bind himself to the concessions pressed upon him by the French ambassador, or assent to more than the restoration of the Cortes in their ancient form. In the meantime, he asked for speedy assistance towards the recovery of his personal freedom, and for a further loan of money to that end.

At Paris, Villèle continued to restrain the zeal of Montmorency, who had actually already sent money and arms, which had been stopped at the frontier. In accordance with Villèle's counsel, France for the present did not go beyond an armed neutrality, and refused to listen to any suggestion of a march through her territory of a foreign (Russian) armed force, while reserving to herself the right of fixing the moment of her own action, and the limits within which she would accept the 'moral support' of the Allies. What, in their turn, was to be their own line of conduct with regard to the Spanish problem, must form the

principal, if not the sole, subject of their deliberations at the European Congress now about to assemble.

PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS AT VIENNA

When, in May, 1821, the Congress of Laibach separated, and Metternich claimed for the Eastern Powers the credit of having saved Europe from a revolutionary conspiracy against the existing order of things, it was felt that another Congress was needed, more particularly for a complete settlement of the affairs of Italy, in which Europe, and Austria in especial took so keen an interest. Florence was, at first, thought of as a suitable locality. But, as has been seen, the area of political movements demanding attention had widely extended; and, since Austria retained the general lead in European politics, it seemed appropriate that the Powers should deliberate within her dominions. Verona was, therefore, chosen; but it was thought convenient that a preliminary series of discussions should take place in the Austrian capital. In these, Tsar Alexander had promised to take part; but he arrived so late, that no regular Conferences could be held at Vienna, though important conversations were held there between the Tsar and Wellington. For the Duke had taken the place which was to have been filled by Londonderry, the startling news of whose tragic death (August 12th, 1822) had reached Vienna just before the beginning of the meetings there.

The instructions drawn up by Londonderry (Castlereagh) for his own guidance at Vienna show, beyond doubt, that he and his Government were

well aware that Spanish affairs might come under discussion there and at Verona, and that Castle-reagh was fully alive to the expediency of a non-intervention policy, of which, therefore, the entire credit ought not to be given to his successor Canning. Great Britain was to observe 'a rigid abstinence from interference in the internal affairs of Spain'; and a consultation *en route* at Paris with the French Ministers might prove of great importance. The Duke of Wellington, accordingly, on his way to Vienna, visited Paris, whence he wrote for 'more specific' instructions. From Italian affairs it was probably intended that British diplomacy should hold aloof, as it had at Troppau and Laibach. When the Duke reached the Austrian capital, he found that these were in the background, and that, to Metternich's great satisfaction, the danger of a Russo-Turkish war was at an end. The Tsar declared Spain to be the headquarters of European Jacobinism, and strongly advocated intervention there, such as had taken place in Naples and Piedmont. But, in the present instance, the probability of independent French action had to be reckoned with. Thus, it was not enough that Villèle (really anxious for peace) instructed Châteaubriand, who (in August) was named to act as one of the three French Plenipotentiaries at Verona, to beware of the bellicose measures on behalf of 'Europe' urged by the Tsar, and took the same tone in his conversations with Wellington at Paris, or that of Vienna. Montmorency, who was to be First French Plenipotentiary at Verona, represented to the Tsar that no necessity for European intervention had as yet arisen in Spain. Neither

Montmorency nor Châteaubriand (though they by no means saw eye to eye with each other) really looked forward to the maintenance by France of a policy of non-intervention; and Châteaubriand has with engaging frankness told us of his resolution to secure to France, *quocunque modo*, the beneficent glory of a victorious war against revolutionary Spain. Metternich, although unwilling to pursue a policy contravening that of Great Britain, felt himself unable to oppose the Tsar directly, but was at the same time determined to prevent any armed Russian interference.

MEETING OF THE CONGRESS OF VERONA.

THE FRANCO-SPANISH PROBLEM

So doubtful was the prospect of agreement among the Powers, when, in the middle of October, 1822, the Congress assembled at Verona in great numerical strength, and with a display of social splendours recalling those of Vienna, seven years earlier. It became obvious, at once, that the Spanish problem would take precedence over all others; and Metternich drew up, of course by Gentz's hand, a Memorandum for communication to the Russian and Prussian Governments on the affairs of both Spain and Portugal, pointing out the necessity, in the interests of these kingdoms and of Europe, of putting an end to 'the so-called Constitutions' imposed upon them. In the case of Spain, he argued, the revolutionary edifice would have long since been overthrown, but for the necessity of safeguarding France, who would naturally be called upon to conduct the assault. It was, therefore, indispensable that the Five

Governments should arrive at an understanding as to the lines of their common policy.

A few days later (October 15th), Montmorency, notwithstanding Villèle's caution, met this manifesto halfway by enquiring, through the plenipotentiaries of the Powers, whether, in the probable event of a Franco-Spanish war, France might reckon on their assistance. Wellington was prepared to give an answer on the spot; the others desired to refer to their respective sovereigns. A fortnight afterwards the replies were to hand. The Russian with the utmost cordiality, the Austrian and Prussian in more guarded terms, declared their willingness to cooperate with France. But Wellington stated that the British Government had since the spring of 1820 (the time of the outbreak of the Spanish Revolution) lost no opportunity of advising the Allies to abstain from any intervention in the internal affairs of Spain. The Alliance had indeed, in Castlereagh's phrase, 'moved away from Great Britain'; and the policy to which, under his guidance, she had steadily adhered in the last two years of his life she was not likely to abandon now that Canning had taken his place.¹

THE CONCERT OF EUROPE BROKEN UP.

The endeavours of Metternich, anxious, even now, to find a pacific solution, having failed, and

¹ It may serve as an illustration of Châteaubriand's unsurpassed power of self-delusion to mention that he felt certain of the British belief that France would suffer defeat in a war with Spain, and that such a result would shut the door against any renewal of the Bourbon *Pacte de Famille* (*cf. op. cit.*, vol. i., pp. 126-7).

France having declined the British offer of mediation between her and Great Britain, a species of compromise was (November 19th) reached between the plenipotentiaries of the three Eastern Powers and of France. Despatches were to be sent to the ambassadors of the former at Madrid, bidding them take their departure unless the Spanish Government should change its course—more especially by changing the present situation of the King. At the same time, a Secret Protocol was signed with Montmorency, whereby the Eastern Powers undertook to fulfil their obligations towards France; should she be attacked by Spain, or should the rights of King Ferdinand or his dynasty be overthrown, or should unforeseen cases arise which in the opinion of the French Government and the ambassadors of the Three Powers at Paris should correspond to their obligations. On the following day, Wellington, who had been informed as to these documents, reappeared among the plenipotentiaries, to declare it impossible for his sovereign in this matter to hold the same language as his Allies; so that nothing remained for Great Britain but to seek to allay the agitation which must be expected in Spain. Montmorency, hereupon, took his departure for Paris, there to obtain the approval of the conclusions reached, before they were made known at Madrid, leaving the less scrupulous Chateaubriand behind him at Verona.

Thus, so far as Great Britain was concerned, the Concert of Europe was avowedly at an end, while the attempt to prevent a French war against Spain had proved a failure. For the rest, although the demeanour of France at Verona, as exhibited in

Montmorency's absence by Châteaubriand, became less and less restrained, especially after the November elections had once more raised the self-confidence of the Ultras, Villèle still delayed warlike proceedings against Spain; and, though the Tsar continued to show himself eager for war, the French Minister would not hear of the march of Russian troops through France. In this reserve, he might have had the concurrence of Metternich, had not the Austrian statesman been, above all, anxious to avoid a quarrel with Russia, so long as she kept the peace in the East, which to him was a matter of primary importance. And on this head, at all events, a Conservative policy could be successfully carried out at the Congress of Verona.

A lull having supervened in the discussion of Spanish affairs, those of the Near East were taken up by the active Russian plenipotentiary Tatischeff at the point where they had been left at the time of the fall of Capo d'Istria. Castlereagh's instructions for Verona had been not to recognise the Greeks as belligerents, but to seek to bring about the close of the struggle; and Canning had subsequently directed that Strangford should do what he could towards obtaining for the Greeks a generous and comprehensive amnesty. Though Russia increased her demands on the Porte, claiming the revocation of all measures restricting navigation in the Black Sea, no serious difference arose on this score among the Powers; on the other hand, no attention was paid by any of them to the petition for aid addressed from America to the Christian sovereigns at Verona by an emissary of the Greek Provisional Government. The subse-

quent history of the relations between the Greek Insurrection and the Concert of Europe—or what remained of it—falls outside the range of this sketch; it includes a proposal by Strangford (in 1825) to send to the Porte a collective menace representing ‘the united voice of the five Allied Courts,’ which drew upon the ambassador a reprimand from Canning—to whose diplomatic dictionary, ‘as Gentz observed, ‘such phrases had long been unknown.’ Canning’s avoidance, in the following year, of a Congress, and resort to a more expeditious method, were dictated by a sure instinct.

The affairs of Italy, for the settlement of which the Congress had been originally proposed, occupied little of its attention till near its close. The treatment of this subject then took a course not less satisfactory to Austria than had, in a different way, been that of the Græco-Turkish trouble. The persecutions which had followed on the return of King Ferdinand to Naples continued, even after the dismissal of the most remorseless of his Ministers; and, though a reduction of the Austrian force began at the end of December (1822), there was no visible intention of bringing the military occupation to a close.¹ In the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom and the northern and central states more or less under Austrian tutelage, constant raids were carried on, as in the south, upon actual or supposed *Carbonari*. Although the French plenipotentiaries at Verona had been instructed to use their best endeavours for protecting the Italian states against the domination of Austria, they did nothing; while the in-

¹ The last Austrian troops did not quit Naples till the beginning of 1825.

structions of their British colleagues merely bound them to prevent any steps being taken in contravention of European Treaties. As to Piedmont, which was not evacuated by the Austrians till late in 1823, the Congress had under consideration the question of the future succession of Prince Charles Albert to the Sardinian throne. Metternich declined to interfere with the principle of legitimacy, but suggested the requirement of guarantees from the suspect Prince.¹ Thus, when, in December, 1822, Metternich, in the name of the Eastern Powers, laid before the several Italian plenipotentiaries assembled at Verona a declaration which, while deprecating any intervention in the concerns of other states, asked for the united efforts of the Italian Governments in the suppression of revolutionary movements, this communication was generally approved in principle, although the suggested method of an Italian Central Commission—a sort of political Inquisition like the German at Mainz—was regarded with so much doubt that it had to be dropped. In the meantime, Austria had again sufficiently asserted her predominant influence in the affairs of Italy, and Verona seemed to have set the seal upon the most successful chapter of Austrian policy in the whole Period of the Congresses.

Yet, that the Concert of Europe had shrunk into the combined action of the ‘three Gentlemen of Verona,’ as Brougham’s not very pungent pleasantry called them,² was shown in some at least of the fur-

¹ He actually succeeded in 1831.

² To this jest Cobbett refers in a passage of his powerful letter thus rendered by Chateaubriand (*op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 343): *les trois gentilshommes de Vérone* (*titre d’une comédie de Shakespeare et allusion aux deux empereurs et au roi de Prusse*).

ther questions to which the Congress addressed itself before its dissolution. The continued complaints of the reactionary Sardinian Government as to the refuge granted to political fugitives in Switzerland were sympathetically received at Verona by the plenipotentiaries of Austria, Russia and Prussia, on the ground that any European state in such straits was entitled to appeal to the 'Allied Powers' for aid; and it was agreed to discuss the subject with the French Government. The British was not approached concerning it. But there were two other questions with regard to which it could not be left out of sight.

THE SOUTH-AMERICAN COLONIES AND THEIR INDEPENDENCE

One of these has already been noted as having gradually become an all but insuperable difficulty in the political life of Spain. Armed intervention for the suppression of the Revolt of the South-American Colonies of Spain had been urged by Tsar Alexander, and deprecated by Castlereagh, at Aix-la-Chapelle; and the Spanish Government had consistently refused repeated offers of mediation on the part of Great Britain. Meanwhile, British trade with these Colonies had continued to increase, and a tacit understanding had come to obtain between Great Britain and Spain that, so long as the former refrained from recognising the independence of the revolted Colonies, Spain would not interfere with the trade between them and Great Britain. In his instructions for Verona, Castlereagh, while stating that no recognition would take place, while the conflict with the

Spanish Government still continued, treated the grant of it to the Colonies as merely a matter of time. Canning was, therefore, but carrying to its logical consequences a policy already adopted by the British Government, when, on September 27th, 1822, he wrote to Wellington that Great Britain must not in any circumstances be pledged against recognition, and that she might be compelled to accord it immediately (before the meeting of Parliament). As a matter of fact, the United States having already set the example, the interests of Great Britain rendered the same step necessary on her part, if her trade with the New World was not to suffer irrecoverably—more especially since France was suspected of designs which the Tsar was prepared to encourage.¹ Wellington's calm communication to the Congress of Canning's despatch aroused a protest, in which all the Plenipotentiaries (including, of course, Châteaubriand) joined; nor could there be any doubt but that to the Spanish difficulty, as a source of disunion between the Powers in the Old World, had been added a cause of patent discord in the New.

THE SLAVE-TRADE

One other question, in which, much to her honour, Great Britain had, during the whole of this period, stood isolated among the European Powers, and which she had forced upon their attention both at Vienna and at Aix-la-Chapelle, was brought up at Verona on November 28th, 1822, by a Declaration presented by Wellington. Notwithstanding

¹ Châteaubriand mentions with complacency the notion of two or three Bourbon monarchies, to be set up in South America.

the resolutions adopted, in 1815, at Vienna and at Paris, the African Slave-trade had been carried on without abatement in the south-African dominions of Portugal, with the connivance of France, who refused to admit the right of search agreed to by the other Maritime Powers. Wellington's proposals for incisive action, accordingly, met with active opposition at Verona, where the eloquence of Chateaubriand revealed the jealousy of French feeling; and, for the moment, all that could be done was to adjourn further consideration of the subject to Conferences to be held in London. The Treaty with Brazil for the suppression of the Slave-trade was not concluded till 1827, three years after Canning had carried in the House of Commons the proposals which, in 1833, led to the Act of Abolition of Slavery throughout the British dominions.

END OF THE CONGRESS, AND OF THE EPOCH

Thus, before Christmastide, 1822, the last of the Congresses which had represented, or professed to represent, the Concert of Europe separated without having resolved on common action, either as to the question pressing upon it most urgently or as to others. ‘The time for Areopagus, and the like of that,’ as Canning irreverently declared, had gone by. Yet, in their farewell Circular to their plenipotentiaries (December 14th), the three Eastern Powers—Gentz once more acting as their mouth-piece—could treat the settlement of Italy as a consummation effected by the Congress; though they made no secret of the fact that the condition of Spain remained unredeemed, while an appeal for the preservation of Europe from the Revolution

must lie more largely to the endeavours of the future than to the achievements of the past. There would, in good truth, hardly be so much as a pretence that the unity of action based on common interests, and the pursuit of common ideals which previous Congresses had, more or less successfully, striven to display, had been the guiding principle at Verona, where Metternich had striven in vain, and Canning's policy had openly declined, to restore the broken harmony, and where, in the end, the antagonistic principle of Non-intervention in the internal affairs of nations had asserted itself. The historical importance of the Congress of Verona is therefore rightly described as consisting in the fact that, instead of marking out the height, it announced the close of an epoch.

The Congress, it may be convenient to add, broke up with the knowledge that the particular problem, which had engrossed so much of its attention, must speedily find its decision elsewhere; nor could the political condition of France leave much doubt as to the direction which that decision would take. The offer of British mediation between France and Spain, which at Verona Wellington had declined, was now made for him at Paris on his way home, but, as had been foreseen, in vain. On Christmas-day, 1822, in the presence of King Louis XVIII., the whole of the French Ministry, with the exception of Villèle, voted for keeping French policy towards Spain in line with that of the Eastern Powers; but, by the advice of the King himself, aware that upon France must fall the immediate conduct of hostilities against Spain, diplomatic relations with her were not at once broken off.

But the delay was only momentary. Though Montmorency resigned, the belligerent Chateaubriand, with many protestations, succeeded him as Foreign Minister; and, though the Spanish reply to the last French note was more courteous than those to the Eastern Powers, the subsequent departure of their ambassadors was speedily followed by that of the French. King Louis XVIII. had to give way, and, after parliamentary scenes of unprecedented violence at Paris, the war began. On April 7th, 1823, the advance-guard of the French commander, the Duc d'Angoulême, crossed the Bidassoa. In the same month (April 28th), a powerful speech by Canning warned all whom it might concern that the strength of Great Britain, though quiescent at the moment, might, on adequate occasion, be called into action.

THE FRENCH INVASION OF SPAIN—THE SOUTH-AMERICAN COLONIES

The result of the French invasion of Spain was to bring to a fall the unstable constitutional edifice set up at Madrid, but not to restore order or the fundamental conditions of national prosperity to the unhappy kingdom which the French arms had mastered in the name of ‘legitimacy.’ As the state of things went on from bad to worse, there could no longer be any question of Spain maintaining her traditional policy towards the revolted South-American Colonies which at Verona had met with the sympathy of the Eastern Powers. Yet Spanish pride would not listen to the idea of an amicable separation, such as was (in 1825) agreed to between Portugal and Brazil. After the success

of the French army of invasion in Spain, the French Government, indeed, suggested that the future of the South-American Colonies should be settled by a Conference at Paris; but to this Great Britain naturally demurred. Of her own ultimate action there could be no doubt, even had not the United States in December, 1823, proclaimed the doctrine of Non-intervention in America as a principle of their own policy,¹ and even had Great Britain herself not in this year appointed consuls in South-America, and, in the following, concluded a commercial treaty with Buenos Aires. On the last day of 1824, the British Cabinet declared for recognition. The principle of Non-intervention was thus asserted contemporaneously with the collapse of the Concert of Europe, and another era began in the political history of the New, as well as in that of the Old, World.

PORTUGAL, FRANCE AND GERMANY

Portugal, whose 'Constitutional' Revolution had been treated by the Congress of Verona, under Metternich's guidance, as part and parcel of the Spanish, and subjected to the same uncompromising condemnation, had been preserved from the intervention in store for her neighbour, by the intimacy of her relations with Great Britain. King João VI, having returned from Brazil to Lisbon, the Constitution granted by him (September, 1822) failed

¹ For the subsequent development of the *Monroe Doctrine* then accepted by the United States Government, Canning is certainly not to be held in any way responsible. The Panama Congress of 1826, which discussed the Union of American States, North and South, came to no conclusion in its favour—partly through his influence.

to improve the social and economic condition of the kingdom; and the declared separation of Brazil from the mother-country under the Crown-prince Dom Pedro (October) completed the disillusionment of the Liberals. At Lisbon, the intrigues of Queen Carlota and her second son, Dom Miguel, fostered the hopes of the Reactionaries. Encouraged by the success of the French invasion of Spain, they, in May, 1823, brought about a counter-revolution, which ran a course in many respects analogous to that of affairs in the neighbouring kingdom and earned the approval of the Tsar Alexander. It culminated in a brief reign of terror at Lisbon (April, 1824) and the escape of the King on board a British warship. Conferences, presided over by Canning, in London arranged for the formal separation of Brazil from Portugal which was signed at Rio in August, 1825; and, since the counterscheme of a new Congress broke down, the Concert policy had suffered another defeat through Canning's mediatory endeavours. But the peace between the parties, patched up in Portugal, was not to prove of long endurance; nor was the country to begin to recover its prosperity for nearly another generation.

In France itself, the triumphant self-assertion of the Reaction in the Spanish campaign had raised the arrogance of the Ultra-royalists to an extreme pitch. Although Villèle was at one with the King (whose policy was Moderate like his own) in the dismissal of Chateaubriand, the indignant pen of that personage turned upon his former colleague, with a fury which did not spare the throne. In the midst of these alarms, the shrewd old

monarch at last passed away (September 1824), and was succeeded by the Comte d'Artois as Charles X. The future of France now seemed once more to lie at the mercy of the Reactionary faction, of which the new sovereign had long been the chief in Church and State.

German home politics had played no prominent part in the deliberations at Verona, since there had been no slackening in the cooperation between Austria and Prussia—or, in other words, in the general deference of the latter to the former on all subjects, foreign or domestic, which received the special attention of both Governments. The unanimous acceptance by the Federal Diet of the Carlsbad Decrees (September, 1819), the passing by the same body of the so-called Vienna Final Act (August, 1820) and its approval of the renewal of the Carlsbad Decrees (January, 1824), marked the unbroken ascendancy of the Reaction which the *entente* between the two Great Powers ensured; and the Mainz Commission for the repression of demagogy continued more or less at work during the eight years of its existence (1819–27). These concerns did not much trouble the great personages at Verona, though there had been some talk between the Austrian and Prussian Ministers of invoking the aid of the Tsar for repressing the Liberal sympathies of his brother-in-law, King William I., of Württemberg. On the whole, the two German Great Powers might safely be left to carry on their own ignoble work at home. Much of the police tyranny which marked this humiliating period of the national life, particularly in Prussia, was of a petty kind, as compared with the blood-

thirstiness of southern persecutions; but, since it spent itself, above all, on the chief sources of popular enlightenment, education and the Press, it ate deeply and enduringly into the heart of the nation.

THE GREEK QUESTION AND THE PETERSBURG CONFERENCES

One question remained, of which the Congress of Verona had declined to touch more than the fringe, and which was not to be brought to a settlement in the immediate future. At the Congress, Tsar Alexander had, as was seen, taken no step calculated to sustain the sinking Hellenic cause, and had even begun to move, or to allow the representatives of Austria and Great Britain at Constantinople to move, in the direction of a reconciliation between Russia and the Porte. But no such reconciliation was possible, so long as the Greek Insurrection continued. And, notwithstanding its vicissitudes, European sympathy with it—Philhellenism, in a word—had never before been so ardent or so widespread. Thus, in the interview between the Tsar and the Austrian Emperor at Czernowitz (October, 1823), a first attempt was made to bring about a ‘pacification’ of Greece by means of Conferences between the ambassadors of the Great Powers in Petersburg. But when, in response to the Russian proposal to this effect, the Conferences met there in June and July, 1824, no basis for an agreement was found by them, or was really possible. Russia’s design of placing Greece, as a semi-independent principality, under the Turkish protectorate, this relationship to be guaranteed by the Powers, offended

Turkish pride, while failing to satisfy Greek aspirations. This being so, Great Britain declined to offend against the principle of Non-intervention by forcing a decision upon either side—for the Greeks as well as the Turks, were treated by her as belligerents; and the Conferences broke down—not to the satisfaction of Metternich. The second Petersburg Conference on the subject, held in April, 1875, in which Great Britain took no part, really made no further progress. For, although it was here resolved to endeavour to induce the Porte to accept the intervention of the Powers, the Russian proposal to enforce this advice found no support, except, in a measure, from Prussia, and the invitation itself was declined by the Sultan. In other words, the question of effective intervention in Greece was once more left unsettled; and the last declaration on the subject, made by Tsar Alexander before his death, was the statement through Nesselrode (August 18th), that, as to the Eastern Question, Russia would henceforth act as befitted her own dignity and interests, without entering into further explanations with her Allies.

THE CONCERT OF EUROPE AT THE END

This pronouncement in favour of Non-intervention was not, indeed, the last word in the history of the foreign policy of Russia or in that of the Powers who had joined with her in the Troppau Protocol. But it put the seal upon the entombment of that Concert of Europe which we have regarded as the height of achievement in the Period of Congresses. It was not the Concert of Europe, which in July, 1827, responded to the appeal of

the Greeks to save them from annihilation, but a separate combination of the Three Powers—Great Britain, France and Russia—against which Austria and Prussia protested. Once more, in the political history of Europe there began a new era, of which the guns at Navarino announced the advent and which opened with the recognition by the Porte of the independence of Greece. The Concert of Europe was no more, and the new kingdom of Greece stood under the guarantee of the Three Powers who had intervened on her behalf. Henceforth, the respect still paid by the several Great Powers to the Treaties in which they had borne a part, and their care for the maintenance of the Balance of Power, were to be once more substituted for attempts at a representative League of Sovereigns or of Governments. Peradventure, with the gradual growth of an acknowledged system of International Law, and in an age which was striving to leave that of Absolutism behind it, the nations might at last succeed where Sovereigns and Governments had failed.